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Moral Status and Agent-Centred Options 
SETH LAZAR 





If we were required to sacrifice our own interests whenever doing so was best overall, or 
prohibited from doing so unless it was optimal, then we would be mere sites for the 
realisation of value. Our interests, not ourselves, would wholly determine what we ought to 
do. We are not mere sites for the realisation of value—instead we, ourselves, matter 
unconditionally. So we have options to act suboptimally. These options have limits, 
grounded in the very same considerations. Though not merely such sites, you and I are also 
sites for the realisation of value, and our interests (and ourselves) must therefore 
sometimes determine what others ought to do, in particular requiring them to bear 
reasonable costs for our sake. Likewise, just as my moral status grounds a requirement that 
others show me appropriate respect, so must I do to myself.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Morally speaking, perhaps I shouldn’t be writing this essay. I could be doing something 
much better with my time. I’m not skilled, but I’m a reasonably fast learner—perhaps with 
dedication and retraining I could save some lives. I could surely earn more than I do now, 
and money can definitely save lives. We can quibble over details, but it would be a strange 
coincidence if sitting here at this desk, in my warm study, with the rain beating its steady 
rhythm on the roof of my house, I was doing the very best I could, morally speaking.1 What 
luck that would be!  
The thing is, I don’t feel like I’m doing anything wrong. Not really at all. I should 
probably give more than I do to charity. I definitely spend more than I should on silly 
things like Star Wars figures (for my son… mostly). But I’m not going that far wrong.  
To give it a technical name, I think that I have a self-favouring option to act sub-optimally, 
                                                        
1 Some advocates of indirect or subjective consequentialism argue that actually just living our lives in a more 
or less ordinary way does maximise (expected) value. See, for example, P. Pettit, 'The Consequentialist 
Perspective', Three Methods of Ethics, ed. Philip Pettit, Marcia Baron, and Michael A. Slote (Oxford, 1997), pp. 
92-174.  
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which licenses my indulging my philosophical curiosity rather than realising the morally 
best outcome. Of course, if I want to sacrifice my own interests for the sake of a better 
outcome for others, then in most cases I would be permitted to do so. If I did, I would be 
acting supererogatorily.2  
Self-favouring options are not the only kind.3 Suppose, for example, that you and I have 
been slogging through the desert for hours, and my greater size means that I am more 
dehydrated than you. Our last drop of water would do me more good than it would you. 
And yet I pass you the bottle. This too is a suboptimal outcome—the world would go better 
if I took the water rather than you. But altruistic self-sacrifices like this are clearly 
permitted.  
Indeed, even mere self-sacrifice is morally permissible. Suppose I can order Chinese or 
Indian takeaway tonight. I would enjoy the Indian meal more, and my innocent enjoyment 
makes the world a better place. So if I was required to maximise value, it would be morally 
wrong to order the Chinese. But simply acting irrationally is surely not morally wrong. 
Indeed, often actively harming or frustrating my own interests is morally permissible. 
These are all species of self-sacrificing options. 
Let’s call all of these agent-centred options. Now, perhaps my readiness to assent to agent-
centred options illicitly imports a certain kind of political liberalism into moral theory. Or 
maybe it’s all self-serving nonsense; really I ought to maximise value—I don’t have options 
to act suboptimally. Or perhaps there’s simply no general injunction to bring about the 
most good, and I should stop worrying and enjoy playing Star Wars. We should not dismiss 
these possibilities. But before we embrace them, there are at least three philosophically 
interesting questions we can ask: 
                                                        
2 One  might think that taking on a great burden for the sake of a trivial benefit to others is impermissible; 
even if we don't take that view, we might not describe such an action as supererogatory. Thanks to a referee 
here. See B. Curtis, 'The Supererogatory, the Foolish and the Morally Required', The Journal of Value Inquiry 15 
(1981), pp. 311-18. 
3 M. Slote, 'Morality and Self-Other Asymmetry', The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 179-92: 180; C. D. Broad, 
'Self and Others', ed. David R Cheney (1971), pp. 1-9. 
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First, does commonsense morality recognise agent-centred options?4  
Second, are agent-centred options defensible?5 
And third, can consequentialists—people who normally think that morality 
requires us to maximise value—accommodate agent-centred options?6  
In my view, the first and third of these questions have been amply covered. But, for a long 
time at least, the second has been neglected. More has been said about self-favouring 
options than about self-sacrificing ones. But their justification has been explored in most 
detail by someone convinced of their immorality.7 Though his book, The Limits of Morality, 
inspired several defences of agent-centred options against his critique,8 I think Kagan 
rightly ended those discussions by noting that, as yet, nobody had given a persuasive 
defence of agent-centred options that coheres with a plausible overall moral theory.9 The 
two decades since have seen modest advances.10 Most philosophers working in this area 
have simply tried to develop a plausible extension of consequentialism that could 
accommodate agent-centred options, if they were justified. This is understandable, since 
agent-centred options are at least prima facie an embarrassment for consequentialism. But 
it means that we lack a convincing positive case in their favour. 
In this paper, I provide a new argument for agent-centred options It draws directly on 
the fundamental deontological idea that beings with moral status are not mere sites for the 
                                                        
4 Slote, 'Self-Other Asymmetry'; S. Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism (Oxford, 1994); S. Kagan, The 
Limits of Morality (Oxford, 1989); T. Mulgan, The Demands of Consequentialism 2005); T. Hurka and E. Shubert, 
'Permissions to Do Less Than the Best: A Moving Band', Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 2, ed. Mark 
Timmons (Oxford, 2012), pp. 1-27. 
5 Scheffler, Rejection; S. Shiffrin, 'Moral Autonomy and Agent-Centred Options', Analysis 51 (1991), pp. 244-54; 
B. Williams, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973-1980 (Cambridge, 1981); P. Hurley, 'Getting Our Options 
Clear: A Closer Look at Agent-Centered Options', Philosophical Studies 78 (1995), pp. 163-88. 
6 D. W. Portmore, Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality (Oxford, 2011); D. Dorsey, 
'The Supererogatory, and How to Accommodate It', Utilitas 25 (2013), pp. 355-82; Mulgan, Demands; D. Sobel, 
'The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection', Philosophers' Imprint 7 (2007), pp. 1-17. 
7 Kagan, Limits. 
8 D. W. Brock, 'Defending Moral Options', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1991), pp. 909-13; F. M. 
Kamm, 'Non-Consequentialism, the Person as an End-in-Itself, and the Significance of Status', Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 21 (1992), pp. 354-89; M. E. Bratman, 'Kagan on 'the Appeal to Cost'', Ethics 104 (1994), pp. 325-32; J. 
Waldron, 'Kagan on Requirements: Mill on Sanctions', Ethics 104 (1994), pp. 310-24. 
9 S. Kagan, 'Defending Options', Ethics 104 (1994), pp. 333-51: 928. 
10 Though see Hurley, 'Getting'; Shiffrin, 'Moral Autonomy'. 
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realisation of value. Other arguments for options tend to appeal either to the disvalue of a 
life lived in pursuit of the overall good, or to our unfortunate incapacity to be motivated by 
Sidgwickian impartiality. Deontologists might be sceptical about the appeal to value in the 
first case, and the concessionary spirit of the second. My argument draws on ideas that are 
more in their wheelhouse.11 
I do not mean, however, to pick apart the competition. In Section 2, I will use familiar 
critiques of those arguments to pinpoint desiderata for a case for agent-centred options. 
Section 3 will present the argument, Section 4 considers objections. Section 5 concludes.  
2. DESIDERATA FOR AN ARGUMENT FOR AGENT-CENTRED 
OPTIONS 
There are three broad families of argument for agent-centred options: positive, negative, 
and what I will call intrinsic. The positive argument is most widely endorsed: if we had 
always to pursue the good, then we would not only be prevented from living fulfilling lives, 
but we would lack a kind of integrity, since our commitments would all be potentially 
revisable, should they prove suboptimal. Options, by contrast, allow us to lead these 
fulfilling lives (that’s why this is a positive argument).12 The negative argument focuses on 
our shortcomings as moral agents, which prevent us from being truly impartial. If we 
cannot be motivated to maximise, then we are not required to do so.13  
The intrinsic approach claims that agent-centred options are not (constitutive) means to 
an end, nor are they concessions to human nature. Instead, they reflect an intrinsically 
justified entitlement not to maximise the good, grounded in the facts that give us moral 
                                                        
11 Fellow-travellers: D. Heyd, Supererogation (Cambridge, 1982); Hurley, 'Getting'.  
12 E.g. Williams, Moral Luck; Scheffler, Rejection.  
13 S. Scheffler, Human Morality (Oxford, 1992). There is a quite different approach to justifying moral options 
(and our moral reasons more generally) that gives the concept of empathy a driving role. I lack the space to 
consider that approach here, but it is no doubt worth pursuing. Thanks to a referee for raising it.  
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status. My argument is a species of this approach.14 
Some of Kagan’s objections to the positive and negative arguments for options are quite 
narrowly targeted. We can ignore those. Others identify more general desiderata—we can 
extract five, in particular. An argument for options (1) must not undergenerate options, nor 
(2) must it overgenerate them; (3) it must generate genuine options, rather than 
requirements; (4) it must be well grounded in an overarching moral theory;  and (5) 
(obviously) it must do more than simply restate, in different terms, the intuition that we 
have such options—it must ground them in something else. Kagan’s focus throughout was 
on self-favouring options, but I would add a sixth: (6) an argument for agent-centred 
options should justify both self-favouring and self-sacrificing options. 
In a little more detail: both the positive and negative arguments fall short at 
desideratum (1), because they are best suited only to justifying options to avoid significant 
sacrifices. The positive argument kicks in only when pursuing the optimal outcome will 
significantly affect my grounding life-projects or my integrity. But we typically think that 
we may suboptimally pursue our own interests even when doing so is much less costly—
for example, giving up an evening every weekend or so to volunteer with a local charity 
would hardly undermine one’s integrity or projects, and yet many people think that 
volunteering in this way is genuinely optional. Of course, the force of this response 
depends on just how demanding our positive duties are—and perhaps the right answer 
here is that our positive duties are genuinely demanding, and our agent-centred options 
kick in only when our integrity or projects are genuinely at threat.15 Still, many of us think 
we have more licence to favour our interests than that. The negative argument too has 
most force when great sacrifices are at stake. I cannot be motivated by a stranger’s well-
being to the same degree as I am by, for example, my son’s. I could be motivated to sacrifice 
                                                        
14 See e.g. Heyd, Supererogation; F. M. Kamm, 'Review: Non-Consequentialism, the Person as an End-in-Itself, 
and the Significance of Status', Philosophy and Public Affairs 21 (1992), pp. 354-89; Hurley, 'Getting'; Shiffrin, 
'Moral Autonomy'; M. A. Slote, Common-Sense Morality and Consequentialism (London, 1985).  
15 Thanks to a referee here. 
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my life to save my son’s, but not to save the stranger’s. But, again, it hardly seems beyond 
our motivational capacities to give up one evening a fortnight to help others.  
An argument for options should justify the full range of options—from the trivial to the 
grandiose. But (2) it must not prove too much. Kagan argued that while common sense 
might allow us to forego benefiting others at excessive personal cost, it prohibits harming 
others to avoid comparable costs.16 Can an advocate of options justify these limits? Nothing 
in either the positive or negative arguments does so—sometimes one can only pursue one's 
projects by harming others; many of us would lack the motivation to respect others’ rights 
against harm if our own lives were at stake. Of course, one can supplement these two 
accounts with some explanation of the difference between doing and allowing, but an 
argument for options is stronger if its limits are built-in.17 
Desideratum (3) is more relevant to the positive than to the negative view. If my projects 
and integrity can justify not pursuing the overall good, then why don't they generate moral 
requirements? One could here invoke Joshua Gert’s distinction between ‘justifying’ and 
‘requiring’ reasons—perhaps one’s projects and integrity can justify, but not require.18 
Indeed, Kagan recognised the category of ‘noninsistent’ reasons, which would have this 
structure.19 But what resources does the positive view of options have to motivate that 
category? What does introducing it do besides furnish a new way of describing the 
phenomenon that we are trying to explain?  
Obviously any argument for agent-centred options should (4) cohere with a convincing 
overall moral theory, rather than simply be an awkward add-on. Kagan raises (5) as a 
particular problem for Slote’s early version of an intrinsic view, which argued that options 
are grounded in the freedom to choose between a range of morally permissible 
                                                        
16 Contrast J. Quong, 'Killing in Self-Defense', Ethics 119 (2009), pp. 507-37.  
17 Sobel, 'Impotence'.  
18 J. Gert, 'Requiring and Justifying: Two Dimensions of Normative Strength', Erkenntnis 59 (2003), pp. 5 - 36. 
19 Kagan, Limits: 378  
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alternatives.20 Kagan argues that this simply restates the intuition that we have options, 
without adding to it.21  
The last desideratum, (6), is raised by Slote.22 It is obviously not an absolute 
requirement. If the best approach to justifying options is piecemeal, then so be it.23 But an 
argument that justifies both kinds of options can draw support from the coherence of the 
overall picture that it presents.  
Obviously much more could be said about each of these desiderata. In particular, 
adherents to either the positive or the negative view might push back and argue either that 
they can satisfy these goals, or that they are not goals worth having. So be it. My aim here is 
to promote a new argument for agent-centred options, not to knock down the others.  
3. MATTERING UNCONDITIONALLY 
The best account of moral status entails that we have self-favouring and self-sacrificing 
options. I’ll first introduce this account of status, then show how it entails options, before 
arguing that it is the right account of moral status. My approach is syncretic: it combines 
two elements of moral status that are often kept separate. The main challenges, then, are to 
show that both of these elements are necessary, and that they are compatible with one 
another. First, though, a note about methodology.  
We can ask at least two interesting questions about moral status: what grounds moral 
status, and what are the implications of moral status? Both questions are very close to 
moral bedrock. Suppose you think that moral status is grounded in rational agency, or that 
it has the implications that I will say that it has. What can you appeal to, in order to justify 
that view? You cannot dig much deeper than you have already gone. So rather than going 
down further into the foundations, you have to look up at the superstructure. We justify 
                                                        
20 Slote, Common-Sense Morality. Mulgan, Demands.  
21 For an independent statement of this concern, see M. U. Walker, 'Autonomy or Integrity: A Reply to Slote', 
Philosophical Papers 18 (1989), pp. 253-63. For a response on Slote’s behalf, see Shiffrin, 'Moral Autonomy'. 
22 Slote, Common-Sense Morality.  
23 Walker, 'Autonomy or Integrity'.   
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our bedrock commitments by showing how they support plausible first-order positions, of 
which the target view is just one. Our aim: to develop a moral theory that best balances the 
virtues of fit with the intuitive ‘data’, explanatory strength, and simplicity.24 This is not 
simply a matter of achieving coherence between our intuitions and our theory—that would 
exaggerate the importance of fitting the data, and underplay explanatory strength and 
simplicity. Our account of moral status should shed light on the substantive conclusions 
that it grounds, rather than just being consistent with them. Some deontologists will reject 
the virtue of simplicity, arguing that if the subject matter is complex, the theory should be 
complex too. Nonetheless, Ockham’s razor still applies: we must avoid needlessly 
multiplying entities. And simplicity can surely break ties when all else is equal.  
 
On, then, to the account of moral status. Moral status is indeed most likely grounded in the 
distinctive properties of rational agents—the distinctively human dimension of our 
capacity for reason (perhaps also found in some other animals). Although I think this 
understanding of the grounds of moral status probably reinforces my account of the 
implications of moral status, I cannot hope to defend both in one paper. So I will say nothing 
further about the grounds of status, and concentrate instead on the implications of having 
full moral status.25 I think there are at least two.   
First, if you have moral status, then your well-being matters: your well-being can affect 
the deontic status of some action for you and others. It can make that action permissible or 
required. It can also make some permissible action supererogatory. There are other ways 
that one’s interests could matter. They could be valuable, or could give reasons for action. I 
focus on ability to affect deontic statuses because this category seems more fundamental. It 
                                                        
24 These criteria are used by Lewis to assess putative laws of nature. But they seem equally apt to moral 
theorising. D. K. Lewis, Philosophical Papers, Volume Ii (New York, 1983). 
25 As the editor pointed out in comments, I don't believe that moral status is binary. It can come in degrees, 
and non-human animals plausibly have some degree of moral status (the degree depending on the kind of 
animal). To avoid unnecessary complexity, throughout the rest of the paper when I refer to having moral 
status, I mean having full moral status. 
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is also more neutral, since we can understand it in terms of reasons or value, but sceptics 
about reasons- or value-based approaches to morality can understand it without them. 
Additionally, there are other ways to matter, besides affecting what others ought to do. 
Your interests might, indeed probably do, also affect what others ought to feel, and what 
attitudes they ought to have. My focus in this paper, however, is solely on action.  
Second, if you have moral status, then you matter, unconditionally. Your capacity to 
affect the deontic status of your and others’ actions is not wholly conditioned on facts 
about you that are contingently true or false. If you matter unconditionally, then you do 
not matter solely if and to the extent that your interests are contingently at stake in some 
decision. If you did not matter unconditionally, then you would not be able to affect the 
status of your and others’ reasons for action except if and to the extent that your interests 
were at stake. You would be a mere site for the realisation of value; a cell in a spreadsheet 
whose moral significance is exhausted by your contribution to the sum at the bottom of the 
column. Since you do matter unconditionally, the degree to which your interests are at 
stake in a choice is only ever one part of the story about how its impacting on you affects 
that decision. 
This is a hybrid account of moral status. The first element is utilitarian in inspiration. It 
expresses a basic welfarist commitment that utilitarians are right to endorse, and that 
others should share (I argue for this below). The second element is, in spirit at least, 
Kantian. It echoes the idea that beings with moral status are ends in themselves, entities 
with dignity, not price. It does so, I think, more successfully than other similar locutions, 
often used to explicate our moral status. We often say that beings with moral status matter 
non-instrumentally, or that they matter intrinsically.26 These are entailed by mattering 
unconditionally, but not vice versa. If you matter non-instrumentally, then you matter 
without regard to the good things to which you are instrumental. But it is consistent with 
                                                        
26 See the papers cited in R. Yetter Chappell, 'Value Receptacles', Noûs 49 (2015), pp. 322-32.  
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mattering non-instrumentally that one matters only to the extent that one’s well-being is at 
stake in some decision. The well-being is your well-being, after all; it is not something 
separate from you to which helping or not harming you is instrumental.  
One's theory of well-being might also describe it as an intrinsic property of the person 
whose well-being it is. So, your mattering intrinsically is consistent with your mattering 
only if and to the extent that your well-being is affected. But if you matter unconditionally 
then you also matter non-instrumentally, since your mattering is not conditional on 
bringing about some other good. And you matter intrinsically, since your mattering is not 
conditional on anything, so a fortiori is not conditioned on anything extrinsic to you. But if 
you matter unconditionally, then your mattering cannot be reduced to the extent to which 
your well-being is at stake in a decision.  
 
This hybrid account of moral status both entails that we have self-favouring and self-
sacrificing options, and helps to determine their limits. Beyond mere extensional fit, it also 
helps explicate agent-centred options. 
On the first point: if we matter unconditionally, then we must have agent-centred 
options. If I had to sacrifice myself whenever doing so came at a lesser cost to me than the 
benefit that I could realise for someone else’s sake—take a cost of X units of well-being, so 
that you can have a benefit of X+1—then I would not matter unconditionally. I would 
matter only insofar as the well-being realised in my life contributes to the overall sum. 
Since I do matter unconditionally, I cannot be required to make these kinds of marginal 
interpersonal tradeoffs. Hence I have at least some self-favouring options.27 
Mattering unconditionally also blocks the promotion of my own interest from 
                                                        
27 I am not arguing that this is the only respect in which my mattering unconditionally makes a difference to 
what I and others ought to do. I am simply saying that, necessarily, if I had to sacrifice my interests by X in 
order to realise a benefit of X+1 for someone else, then I would not matter unconditionally—my mattering 
would depend only on the extent to which my interests are at stake. Thanks to the editor for pressing me 
here.   
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generating requirements, at least sometimes. If I had to promote my own interests 
whenever doing so was best, then my mattering would be conditioned on the extent to 
which some decision served my interests. If I lack any moral right to choose whether to 
pursue my own interests, then I do not matter unconditionally. But if I have self-sacrificing 
options, then, for some acts, I can determine whether that act is permissible regardless of 
its contingent effects on my interests. So I must have at least some self-sacrificing options. 
On the second point: this account of moral status sheds light on the limits of agent-
centred options. Though I matter unconditionally, my interests also matter, as do the 
interests of others. Moreover, if I matter unconditionally, then that can affect what both I 
and others ought to do, in a way that will sometimes limit our licence to favour or 
undermine our own interests. I may not harm others in the pursuit of my own interests, 
because that would treat them as mere sites for the realisation of value, whose interests 
could be damaged whenever doing so marginally benefits my own.28 And the great good 
that I can do by helping others entails that I may not pursue my own interests when by 
bearing a relatively small burden I could advance theirs to a much greater degree. They 
matter unconditionally, and their well-being matters. Recognising this means 
acknowledging that sometimes I have to bear costs for their sake.  
A fundamental task for moral theory, then, is to work out what makes something a 
reasonable cost to bear for the sake of others. This is a fraught and complex question. But 
recognising that others have moral status means recognising that both they and their well-
being can determine the deontic status of your actions. This means, at the very least, that 
your agent-centred options are circumscribed by your duties of easy rescue.  
As for self-sacrificing options: I think that merely frustrating one’s own interests, when 
nobody else is affected, is always permissible. Indeed, even if others are affected, but their 
interests are purely ‘me-regarding’ (for example, think of how a film star’s fans would be 
                                                        
28 W. S. Quinn, 'Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing', Philosophical 
Review 89 (1989), pp. 287-312.  
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upset if he committed suicide), I think I have free rein to undermine my own interests. I 
need not, however, insist on that point. My view is consistent with believing that, since my 
interests matter, and I matter unconditionally, some forms of self-sacrifice are 
unconscionable. If I have to respect others as mattering unconditionally, then I should also 
do so to myself, and this may block my licence to not merely damage my interests, but to 
abase myself. So it may be impermissible, for example, to enter voluntarily into slavery, or 
to pursue a particularly servile relationship.29 Of course, the view is also broad enough to 
cater for those who think that such forms of self-abasement are morally permissible.30 
On the third point: grounding agent-centred options in moral status has additional 
explanatory strength. It helps us see why the problem of moral options is a problem in the 
first place. The principal competitors to this account of moral status endorse one but not 
both of its elements. And if you held one of those competing views, you would almost 
certainly regard the defence of agent-centred options as either trivial or (at least on first 
principles) impossible. Suppose you endorse only the second, more Kantian implication of 
having moral status. Then you would likely adopt one of two views about our duties to aid 
others—either, because there is no general injunction to further the interests of others, we 
have no such positive duties. Or else we have only those positive duties necessary to ensure 
preservation of one another's rational agency—the thing that makes us matter 
unconditionally. On the first view, self-favouring options are trivial—in the absence of 
positive duties to others, we are of course permitted to advance our own interests however 
we like (consistent with respecting our moral status and that of others). On the second 
view, there is also likely to be considerable leeway for self-favouring action. If all humans 
enjoy moral status, which is grounded in their capacity for rational agency, then arguably 
all we need for the preservation of that capacity is the minimal satisfaction of our basic 
                                                        
29 J. Hampton, 'Selflessness and the Loss of Self', Social Philosophy and Policy 10 (1993), pp. 135-65; Hurka and 
Shubert, 'Permissions'. 
30 Thanks to a referee for pressing here. 
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needs.31 Under ordinary circumstances, it should be possible for people to ensure the basic 
needs of others are fulfilled without enduring excessive personal cost. So: plenty of room 
for options.32 
Or suppose that you endorse only the first, welfarist element of moral status. Then too 
you should find agent-centred options uninteresting, at least at the level of first-order 
moral theory (you might have some indirect way of vindicating commonsense). If I matter 
only to the extent that my interests are at stake in a decision, then there is no space for 
options at all in moral theory, whether self-favouring or self-sacrificing. The only puzzle is 
why people continue to endorse an obviously flawed view.  
I suspect, then, that anyone who finds moral options genuinely puzzling already rejects 
the reduction of moral status to only one of these disjuncts, and implicitly endorses 
something like the hybrid account. If you don’t recognise that we are also sites for the 
realisation of value, then there is no general requirement to promote the good, so nothing 
against which options are an exception. The same is true if you think that our positive 
duties are only minimally demanding.  
If you don’t also recognise that we are not mere sites for the realisation of value, then 
you will be unconcerned by marginal interpersonal tradeoffs, and moral requirements to 
advance one’s own good. Moral options are not puzzling for true believers on either side; 
they are puzzling only for those who acknowledge both elements of moral status. The 
hybrid solution is to show that they are not mutually exclusive. 
 
If our well-being matters, but we also matter unconditionally, then we must have at least 
                                                        
31 Of course, there could be other versions of this approach that leave very little room for self-favouring 
options. All I need for my argument here is that there be a version for which such options are easy to justify.  
32 A reviewer notes that, in the world as it is, the imperative to help those whose basic needs are going 
unfulfilled could be all-consuming, leaving no room for self-favouring options. If that's right, then it is true 
that the Kantian may have a hard time justifying agent-centred options—indeed, perhaps they would simply 
deny that we have such options in the real world. In fact, however, I think that the present conditions of need 
are not a function of scarcity, but rather of the lack of political will on the part of the global rich. This raises 
the distinct issue of which kinds of duties one might have to take up the slack left by others not performing 
their primary duties. 
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some self-favouring and self-sacrificing options. But why should we endorse this 
conception of moral status? In particular, what are the advantages of the hybrid theory 
over a strictly utilitarian or a strictly Kantian alternative (where each of those alternatives 
denies the disjunct endorsed by the other)? And is the hybrid itself sustainable? 
Suppose you endorse only the first dimension of moral status. Then, provided that you 
think that our well-being matters in proportion to its magnitude, and that nothing else 
matters, then you are committed to a crude maximising utilitarianism that foreswears not 
only options, but also supererogation, constraints, and considerations of distributive 
justice. Of course, this explains why so few contemporary consequentialists are utilitarians 
in this simple sense. Most either recognise other values besides human welfare, or else 
propose indirect forms of utilitarianism that allow us to attend to more than just the 
relative stakes for each party affected by a decision. These more complex views obviously 
sacrifice simplicity for the sake of fit with common sense. But they also sacrifice 
explanatory strength. As is widely recognised, indirect consequentialism tends to end up 
simply taking the prescriptions of commonsense morality and adding the (untested, 
probably untestable claim) that following these prescriptions will best serve overall well-
being in the long run.33 
Adding the second element of moral status is not only simpler than shifting to indirect 
consequentialism, it also delivers, as I will now show, insight into the justification of 
constraints, the nature of supererogation, the ‘separateness of persons’, and of course self-
favouring and self-sacrificing options. By threading a needle through each of these 
substantive conclusions, the hybrid account of moral status is both strengthened by and 
strengthens them all, as each inherits the plausibility of the others.  
If we are not mere sites for the realisation of value, then there must be constraints on 
harming us for the sake of the greater good. If I could permissibly harm you to degree X, 
                                                        
33 E. Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (London, 1993). 
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just for a benefit of X+1 to some other person, then you would not matter unconditionally.34 
Instead you would matter only if and to the extent that your interests are at stake. Since 
you do matter unconditionally, you must enjoy some additional protection against suffering 
this harm, such that it can be permissible only if both the harm and the additional 
protection are outweighed.35  
The hybrid account also sheds light on supererogation. In the standard case, one acts 
supererogatorily by bearing disproportionate costs for the sake of realising a better 
outcome than one that you could have permissibly brought about. You thereby go ‘beyond 
the call of duty’. Hence one acts supererogatorily by not taking advantage of a self-
favouring option. Indirect consequentialists might license self-favouring options like these 
on grounds of the long-term good done through people pursuing their own projects, or of 
the greater likelihood of people abiding by less demanding norms.  
Sometimes, however, we can act supererogatorily in ways that are unambiguously bad 
from the consequentialist perspective. Since we matter unconditionally, we have a licence 
not to pursue our own interests at least sometimes. Since the well-being of others matters, 
it can affect what we ought to do. If I choose to bear some cost for others’ sake, then within 
bounds I may do so even if the resulting outcome is overall morally worse than a 
permissible alternative. This would still be supererogatory, since I have borne an 
unreasonable cost for the sake of realising benefits for others. This is true, for example, in 
the dehydration case in the introduction. At some point, however, the discrepancy between 
the cost to the agent and the benefits for others is so great that the agent’s self-abasement 
constitutes a failure of self-respect, so runs into the limits on self-sacrificing options.36 
Indirect consequentialists could not plausibly accommodate this kind of supererogation, 
                                                        
34 A similar idea is defended in Quinn, 'Doing and Allowing'; F. Woollard, 'If This Is My Body…: A Defence of 
the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (2013), pp. .  
35 Obviously, some absolutist deontologists think that this additional protection cannot be outweighed.  
36 Curtis, 'Foolish'. Note that not all failures of self-respect involve a significant amount of self-harm. Thanks 
to X for this point. 
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since its net well-being results would always be suboptimal.  
The hybrid account of moral status also echoes the popular idea of the ‘separateness of 
persons’. As Rawls argued, and many others find plausible, it is wrong to apply to a group 
the decision procedure appropriate for an individual deciding for himself.37 My incurring 
some cost for the sake of a benefit that I will later enjoy is different from my imposing some 
cost on you to realise a benefit to me. We cannot be required to make sacrifices for the sake 
of marginally greater benefits to others, nor are we permitted to impose costs on some for 
the sake of marginally greater benefits for others.  
If we matter unconditionally, then marginal interpersonal tradeoffs are neither first-
personally required, nor permissible for one to impose on third parties. A gain of X+1 to 
you cannot fully compensate a cost of X to me. Nor can I permissibly impose a cost of X on 
you for the sake of a gain of X+1 to a third party. So, persons are separate in the Rawlsian 
sense.  
But notice that while the separateness of persons might imply that it would be 
impermissible for me to regard gains to you as wholly offsetting the same sized costs to me, 
the hybrid account of moral status forecloses this possibility. You matter unconditionally, 
so if you want to sacrifice your interests for the sake of averting a same-size, or even smaller 
cost to someone else, then you have a licence to do so. If we matter unconditionally then 
we must we have self-sacrificing options; by contrast, the separateness of persons idea is 
silent on that point. So, the hybrid theory entails the most plausible implication of the 
separateness of persons but not vice versa; the intuitive plausibility of the latter idea lends 
support to the hybrid account of moral status, without simply restating it.  
If you sign up to both disjuncts in the hybrid account of moral status, you have a unified 
foundation for options, constraints, supererogation, and the separateness of persons. We 
could adduce further support by invoking the hybrid account’s implications for egalitarian 
                                                        
37 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, 1999). 
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theories of distributive justice, as well as the moral significance of different kinds of 
harmful agency (in particular the opportunistic/eliminative agency distinction).38 Adopting 
only the first implication of moral status cannot deliver such a plausible overall theory, 
except through some form of indirection whereby it sacrifices both simplicity and 
explanatory strength.  
Perhaps, however, one could argue that endorsing the first disjunct leaves open the 
question of precisely how one’s interests matter. Perhaps we could then distinguish 
between your having reasons to promote the well-being of those with moral status, and 
reasons to respect it.39 I think that when properly fleshed out, this would be a notational 
variant on my hybrid approach defended above. In my terms, it would amount to saying 
that your well-being matters, but that you also matter unconditionally. Consider, for 
example, the possibility that people might have licence to give their own well-being greater 
weight in their deliberations than its impartially considered worth. Where does that 
additional weight come from, if not from recognising that something matters here besides 
just the quantum of well-being? What matters, if not the being with moral status herself? 
 
But could we endorse only the second disjunct in the hybrid account? Why not simply 
argue that people matter unconditionally, and leave their well-being out of it? This would 
guarantee constraints and the separateness of persons. It would also ground options—
trivially, since there would be no general requirement to advance the good of others, so we 
would never have to check our self-interest for the sake of others. Why should the quasi-
Kantian concede any ground to the utilitarian at all? 
I am baffled by the idea that our licence to favour our own interests over others' could 
be absolute in this way. Warren Quinn argues that if I can be required to advance the good 
                                                        
38 W. S. Quinn, 'Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect', Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 18 (1989), pp. 334-51. 
39 Pettit, 'The Consequentialist Perspective'.  
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of others, then I am—or, more precisely, my body is—made into a means by morality.40 
But this is outlandish. Morality must provide us with some scope to pursue our own ends 
regardless of the overall good. But when the actual cost to me is slight in comparison with 
the good done, it seems outrageous to suggest that I always have the option to favour my 
own interests.  
However, appeals to intuition may fall on deaf ears. Recalcitrant deontologists have 
heard them all before.41 Better, then, to focus not on intuitive fit, but on explanatory 
strength. In particular, to reject the first element of moral status deontologists have to insist 
on two related bright-line distinctions for which they cannot provide adequate theoretical 
support. The first is between the justifying and requiring dimensions of normative 
strength.42 The second is between doing and allowing harm.43 
Nobody can deny that my and others’ well-being can justify actions that would 
otherwise be irrational, or indeed impermissible. Supererogation makes no sense if the 
well-being of others does not matter at all. And most deontologists agree that it can 
sometimes be permissible to impose severe costs on some, for the sake of a much greater 
benefit to many others. These verdicts are incomprehensible if the well-being of those with 
moral status lacks any capacity to affect deontic verdicts. The real question, then, is 
whether well-being can have this justifying dimension of normative strength, without also 
having the requiring dimension. Can some consideration, the magnitude of which can vary 
to an arbitrary degree, justify basically anything at the appropriate magnitude, but, 
regardless of magnitude, never generate a requirement to act? 
                                                        
40 Quinn, 'Doing and Allowing'. Frances Kamm implies endorsement for the 'no positive duties' thesis in 
Kamm, 'Review: Non-Consequentialism, the Person as an End-in-Itself, and the Significance of Status'. For a 
canonical Kant-inspired view that we have no positive duties, see e.g. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia 
(Oxford, 1974).  
41 P. Singer, 'Famine, Affluence, and Morality', Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972), pp. 229-43.  
42 J. Gert, 'Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons', The Philosophical Review 116 (2007), pp. 533-62. 
43 Sobel, 'Impotence'; Kagan, Limits.  
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This possibility is conceivable.44 But is it plausible? Could one be permitted to kill one 
person to save a sufficiently large number of others, and yet never required to bear some 
much lesser cost, for the sake of realising as great a good? To believe this, one would have 
to believe that a consideration’s weight along one dimension has absolutely no implications 
for its weight on the other dimension. I agree that we cannot just read off a reason’s 
strength along one dimension from its strength along the other, but this is quite different 
from saying that a consideration (or set of considerations) could have arbitrarily high finite 
strength along one dimension, but none along the other. In other words: if there is some 
number n of people such that it can be permissible to kill one person to save n people’s 
lives, then there must be some number m such that one is required to sacrifice one’s life to 
save them. And there must certainly be some number m-x such that one is required to bear 
some lesser cost for their sake. If this is true, then we must acknowledge that my and 
others’ well-being can affect the deontic status of our actions, and not only by justifying 
what would otherwise be impermissible—they can generate genuine requirements. If this 
is right, then we cannot treat agent-centred options as trivial, and we need something like 
the present argument in their favour. 
The second point is related to the first. All deontologists think that we can be required 
to bear very high costs to avoid harming others. I might be required to sacrifice my life, 
rather than inflict a lesser harm on some other person. Can one coherently endorse this 
view, while thinking that we can never be required to bear even relatively small costs to 
advance others’ well-being? This seems especially implausible, since the categories of 
doing and allowing harm are not natural kinds with clearly defined parameters. The recent 
history of deontological ethics is a testament to the porousness of the boundaries between 
these two categories, as well as the multitude of other distinctions in modes of agency that 
cross-cut and overlap the doing/allowing distinction. There are clear cases of doing, and 
                                                        
44 Gert defends something like this view, though he argues that the well-being of others cannot generate 
rational requirements. My focus is on moral normativity. Gert, 'Requiring and Justifying'. 
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clear cases of allowing, and a great mess in between, that includes, for example, enabling, 
redirecting, withdrawing, risking, and so on. Other things equal, I agree that where our 
intentions are good, we can be required to bear greater costs to avoid doing harm than to 
avoid allowing harm. But the doing/allowing distinction is too messy to sustain a radical 
normative contrast; it is a difference of degree, so cannot sustain a normative difference of 
kind, such as the difference between being able to require anything of a person, and being 
able to require nothing of her.  
Deontologists cannot plausibly deny that the well-being of beings with moral status can 
affect the deontic status of their actions. That denial is not only counterintuitive, it also 
implies that the promotion of others’ well-being can justify anything, but require nothing, 
and implies that we can be required to bear any cost to avoid a harm being connected to us 
in one way, but required to bear none to avoid it being connected to us in another way, 
when the difference between those two forms of connection is vague at best. Justifying and 
requiring are two distinct dimensions of normative strength, but they are not that distinct. 
Doing and allowing are indeed different, usually. But they are not that different.  
Of course, this does leave open the prospect that one could endorse only the second 
element of moral status, but still think that we have positive duties to aid others insofar as 
that is necessitated by what makes them matter unconditionally. For example, we might 
think that we have such duties as enable the preservation of the rational agency of others, 
and nothing more than that. In the end I have little to say against this view: like mine, it 
would justify extensive agent-centred options, since it would retain the idea that I matter 
unconditionally, and so would have to include the entailments of that commitment.  Like 
mine, it is grounded in an account of moral status. It would provide for a narrower set of 
duties to others, and a greater scope for the agent-centred prerogative than my account. 
But in essence it is a fellow-traveller.45 
                                                        
45 Thanks to a referee for helping me to see this point. 
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I cannot survey every competing account of the implications of moral status. And it would 
be unnecessary to do so if the hybrid account were fundamentally unstable. But is it? What 
bars us from recognising both that people’s well-being matters, and that they matter 
unconditionally? There is no conflict between these two views. They simply mean that in 
every choice where a person is affected, how she matters cannot be reduced wholly to the 
effect of the choice on her interests (though her interests do matter, when they are at stake). 
The Hybrid View forfeits something in terms of simplicity to its competitors, since it 
identifies two implications of moral status rather than one. But this is hardly a significant 
cost given the benefits it yields in terms of fit and explanatory strength.  
In section 2, I noted that one’s argument for moral options should be more than just a 
restatement of the belief that we have such options (desideratum 5). The hybrid account 
embeds options in normative bedrock—an account of moral status. As foundations go, this 
account of moral status is not much deeper than the substantive conclusion that it 
underpins. And yet it does not simply restate a conviction in options. It shows, instead, that 
options are a necessary entailment of an attractive conception of moral status, that also 
entails and illuminates many other basic commitments of commonsense morality. The 
idea that we matter unconditionally is more fundamental than the idea that we have agent-
centred options: it entails other basic deontological commitments, where an endorsement 
of options does not. For example, one could defend options on grounds of our inability to 
be motivated by the well-being of others, while denying that morality includes constraints.  
Of course, from such an abstract argument, we cannot hope for any detailed verdict on 
precisely which agent-centred options we have. The argument shows only that we must 
have some. It does, however, satisfy desideratum 1 above, because it rules out being 
required to make marginal interpersonal tradeoffs even when the interests at stake are 
relatively trivial. It also meets desideratum 2, since the account of moral status that grounds 
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options also grounds constraints, which limit the exercise of those options. Desideratum 3 
is likewise satisfied, since the account of moral status grounds both self-favouring and self-
sacrificing options: if I matter unconditionally, then I must be morally permitted to 
disregard my own well-being even when doing so is suboptimal overall. I can pursue my 
own interest because I matter unconditionally, not only to the extent that my interests are 
satisfied. But if I don’t want to pursue my own interest, I am not required to do so in at least 
some cases. Desideratum 4 is a given: this account of moral status neatly underpins a 
relatively uncontroversial take on commonsense morality. Desideratum 5 is satisfied, 
because this conception of moral status entails both that we have options, and other 
fundamental deontological commitments, whereas the idea that we have options does not, 
on its own, entail those other commitments. So we have grounded moral options in 
something other than just a restatement of our belief in those options. And the notion of 
mattering unconditionally allows us to vindicate not only self-favouring options, but also 
self-sacrificing options, as per desideratum 6.  
4. OBJECTIONS 
Four objections to my approach: have I offered a straitened menu of ways to think about 
status? Is my account really more attractive than the alternatives? Can one accommodate 
the worry about being a mere site for the realisation of value without endorsing the second 
implication of moral status? And last, does my account of moral status really entail options 
as well as constraints, rather than constraints alone? I consider each in turn.  
 
On the first objection: I obviously haven’t considered all the possible ways one might 
understand moral status. I have considered my hybrid approach alongside alternatives that 
reject one of the two disjuncts, but there are many other possibilities. If some others are 
independently attractive, and provide as much support as my hybrid account for the other 
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fixed points in commonsense morality, without supporting options, then that would 
undermine my argument. I cannot hope to conceive of and deflect every competing 
account of moral status in a single paper. It should be enough to articulate and positively 
argue for one, and defend it against the two most plausible neighbours.  
 
On the second objection: Frances Kamm once defended constraints by appealing to the 
idea that we are ends in ourselves, so cannot be used to advance the greater good.46 Kagan 
responded: on that account of status, we can’t be used for the sake of others, which means 
we enjoy a privileged status.47 But on his account, we can give others reasons to bear costs 
for our sake, and in virtue of that enjoy a privileged status. Which kind of privilege is 
better?48 
The hybrid theory of status can answer this objection: we do not have to choose. If your 
account of moral status denies that one can be required to bear costs for the sake of 
advancing another’s well-being, then it is impoverished. But Kamm is also right, that if 
one’s interests can be sacrificed just for the sake of a marginal gain to someone else, then 
one’s moral status is to that extent diminished. It is also diminished if one is required to 
sacrifice one’s own interests for the sake of a marginal benefit to someone else. Of course, 
we still need to flesh out the details of precisely which options we have. The hybrid theory 
of moral status is not a complete moral theory. But it can blunt Kagan’s criticism, without 
sacrificing the virtues of Kamm’s account.  
 
On the third objection: in recent work, Richard Yetter Chappell has argued that, insofar as 
it constitutes a genuine, non-trivial objection to consequentialism, the ‘separateness of 
                                                        
46 Kamm, 'Status'. 
47 Kagan, 'Defending Options'.  
48 Compare Sobel, 'Impotence'. 
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persons’ objection can be overcome.49 He is interested in constraints, not options. But his 
objection carries over to options, as well as to the sites of value argument.  
Yetter Chappell considers some implausible interpretations of the separateness of 
persons objection, and dismisses them. He then proposes the following gloss: a theory is 
vulnerable to the separateness of persons objection if, when licensing interpersonal trade-
offs, it implies that the benefit achieved fully cancels out the cost, such that there are no 
grounds for compunction or regret, no loss to mourn. On the deprecated view, people are 
fungible in the way that bank notes are fungible—if you lose a tenner and gain two fivers, 
then you haven’t lost anything at all. All that matters is the net result. Some 
consequentialists might think of people and their interests like this: if one person suffers a 
loss, but two others enjoy a benefit that aggregates to the same amount, we need only 
attend to the neutral net result. Only aggregate welfare is non-instrumentally valuable; 
people are merely instruments to that end. 
This is what Yetter Chappell (drawing on Peter Singer) means by a ‘value receptacle’: 
people are to value (well-being) as banknotes are to money. This would be a gross mistake 
in a moral theory. But, as Yetter Chappell rightly observes, it is not one that utilitarians 
need make. Instead of treating people as fungible, and considering only aggregate well-
being to be non-instrumentally valuable, they clearly can care independently about each 
person affected by an interpersonal trade-off, and regret the cost that someone has to bear 
for the sake of the overall good. They can assign non-instrumental value to each 
individual’s well-being, rather than just the aggregate. But this has no bearing on what we 
ought to do—a cost of X to you is still worth only X, so can be outweighed by a benefit of 
X+1 to someone else.  
Yetter Chappell’s treatment of the separateness of persons has several weaknesses. 
First, what does it mean to value aggregate well-being non-instrumentally, while valuing 
                                                        
49 Yetter Chappell, 'Receptacles'. 
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the well-being of individuals only instrumentally? The view seems a straw man. Aggregate 
well-being is composed of the well-being of individuals. If aggregate well-being is a non-
instrumental value, then individual well-being is a non-instrumental value, since aggregate 
well-being just is all the individual well-being taken together. Treating different people’s 
well-being as totally fungible is a conceptual mistake, hence not a charitable interpretation 
of the separateness of persons objection.  
Second, Yetter Chappell thinks the objection has to do only with attitudes. His token-
pluralistic utilitarianism can, in its deontic verdicts, be extensionally identical to token-
monistic utilitarianism (according to which only aggregate well-being is non-
instrumentally valuable), but preferable since it encourages us to adopt the appropriate 
attitude to the losses inflicted in the pursuit of the overall good. This misunderstands the 
separateness of persons worry. It has nothing to do with our attitudes: it concerns instead 
what we ought to do. We ought not assume that benefits to one person can cancel out 
same-sized costs to another. 
To see that attitudes are beside the point, notice that it’s often bad to treat costs and 
benefits as fungible, even when it is acceptable to treat an entity as a mere site for the 
realisation of value. Suppose, for example, you are managing a population of kangaroos in 
a nature reserve. It might be necessary to cull some to allow the remainder to flourish—
perhaps overpopulation is causing starvation and disease. But it would be extraordinarily 
callous to feel no ambivalence about such an extreme endeavour. The deaths of the culled 
‘roos are not ‘cancelled out’ by the good realised by the overall population. You shouldn’t 
care only about the net result. And yet these kinds of  marginal intraspecies trade-offs are 
completely defensible, since kangaroos do not have the same kind of moral status as do 
humans, so treating them as mere sites for the realisation of value is acceptable. We may 
justifiably ignore the separateness of kangaroos.  
Indeed, even when making intrapersonal trade-offs, it is often a mistake to regard costs 
 26 
and benefits as cancelling one another out. If I endure hardship now for the sake of a 
benefit later—getting up at all hours to take Moab, my Labrador, outside so that he’ll be 
housetrained—then the cost and benefit are not fungible with one another. I suffer a cost 
now—a deficit in non-instrumentally valuable well-being—for the sake of a later benefit. 
The benefit is great enough to justify the cost, but does not cancel it out. Yetter Chappell 
offers the ‘fungibility’ worry as an interpretation of the separateness of persons objection. 
But it is as much a mistake to consider intrapersonal costs and benefits fungible as it is to 
regard interpersonal costs and benefits in this way. Since the point of the objection is the 
difference between intrapersonal and interpersonal trade-offs, this cannot be an adequate 
interpretation of that objection. 
Here is a more promising interpretation. Valuing Gareth or Geraint’s well-being non-
instrumentally is not the same as valuing Gareth or Geraint unconditionally. Yetter 
Chappell’s token-pluralistic utilitarian still cares about Gareth or Geraint only insofar as 
their well-being makes the world a better place. They are still mere value receptacles, even 
if their well-being is not fungible. To value them unconditionally, you have to recognise 
that each can determine what you ought to do, independent of contingent facts about how 
your action affects his well-being. Otherwise what you value is the well-being, not Gareth 
or Geraint, and you’re disrespecting them by treating their lives as containers for the stuff 
that you really do care about. And since you care only about the value realised in their 
lives, rather than about Gareth or Geraint, where the value is located makes no difference 
to what you ought to do. So you can sacrifice Geraint’s interests for a marginally better 
outcome for Gareth. Of course, you care about well-being non-instrumentally, so you 
recognise that Geraint suffers a genuine loss. But since he matters only contingently, 
insofar as your actions affect his well-being, this loss doesn’t affect what you ought to do. 
You ignore the distinction between persons, because you don’t think that each person is 
unconditionally valuable, separately from the well-being realised in his life. 
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Of course, this presupposes that we should value Gareth and Geraint unconditionally, 
rather than caring only about their well-being. In other words, it presupposes my account 
of moral status. And a utilitarian would reject that account. The force of the separateness of 
persons objection then reduces to the force of the argument for this account of moral 
status. Does this make the objection trivial, in Yetter Chappell’s sense? I do not know. It 
certainly makes it external, in a way that Yetter Chappell’s version is not. But that strikes 
me as exactly right. The separateness of persons objection, and the deeper sites of value 
idea that underpins it, pinpoint a fault-line between ethical theories. The disagreement 
here is profound. We should not expect it to be translatable into an internal objection, 
grounded in shared premises. At this level, all putative foundations are controversial. We 
can do no more than make the best case we can for our different understandings of the 
foundations of ethics.  
 
The preceding objections questioned either my menu of conceptions of moral status, or my 
choice from that menu. But one might think that we can make the same choice that I made, 
without endorsing agent-centred options. Could one believe both that we are sites for the 
realisation of value, and that we are not mere sites for the realisation of value, and yet deny 
that we have options?  
The simplest route to this conclusion would be to endorse constraints, but reject 
options. Then you might think that our status as ends in ourselves is properly 
acknowledged, because other people may not treat us as mere sites for the realisation of 
value. But we ourselves are required to sacrifice our interests whenever doing so is optimal. 
I think this is a mistake. How could one believe that we matter unconditionally, and yet 
believe that it is wrong to sub-optimally sacrifice our own interests, and mandatory to bear 
costs for the sake of a net overall improvement? It is inconsistent to justify constraints by 
appeal to the sites idea, and then deny that it has these further implications. If you are a 
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mere site for the realisation of value, since you can be required to bear a cost of X for the 
sake of a benefit of X+1 to someone else, then it should be permissible for others to treat you 
as such a site, and impose that cost on you for the other person’s benefit. We are prohibited 
from treating others as mere means only if they are not mere means!  
Of course, one could counter here that sometimes we have a ‘right to do wrong’—it 
might be wrong for others to force me to bear a cost that I am required to take on myself. 
But in the plausible examples of this phenomenon, some specific factor explains why 
others may not interfere. For example, a father might be morally required to love his 
children. But it would be inappropriate for anyone else to enforce that requirement 
because doing so would be self-defeating—love is probably not in our voluntary control, 
and even if it was, would lose value if the father was forced to love. It might also be morally 
wrong to form some kinds of thoughts, but others couldn’t enforce our obligations in this 
case, because they lack access to our minds. But it is wholly implausible that the full range 
of agent-centred options, as well as supererogatory action, can be explained in this way. 
The sites idea entails that we have options even when, if we didn’t have that option, it 
would clearly be permissible for others to enforce our moral obligations. The most obvious 
examples of this are monetary: I have a moral option to waste my own resources if I want 
to, and to forebear from making sacrifices for the benefit of others beyond a given point, 
because I am not a mere site for the realisation of value. If I was morally required to bear 
those costs for others’ sake, then it would obviously be permissible for others to enforce 
those moral requirements, for example through taxation. The right to do wrong neither 
adequately explains our options to act suboptimally, nor successfully captures the idea that 




If we were required to sacrifice our own interests whenever doing so was best overall, or 
prohibited from doing so unless it was optimal, then we would be mere sites for the 
realisation of value. Our interests, not ourselves, would wholly determine what we ought to 
do. We are not mere sites for the realisation of value—instead we, ourselves, matter 
unconditionally. So we have options to act suboptimally. These options have limits, 
grounded in the very same considerations. Though not merely such sites, you and I are also 
sites for the realisation of value, and our interests (and ourselves) must therefore 
sometimes determine what others ought to do, in particular requiring them to bear 
reasonable costs for our sake. Likewise, just as my moral status grounds a requirement that 
others show me appropriate respect, so must I do to myself. I suggested above that mere 
self-harm (damaging my own interests) is always permissible, but some forms of self-
abasement are not. Much more needs to be said; in particular, while the present argument 
ensures that we have some self-favouring and self-sacrificing options, it leaves open their 
precise contours. I leave those details for another time; my aim here has been to show that 
agent-centred options are directly grounded in an understanding of moral status that 
deontologists can adopt, and which we should adopt, because it balances the virtues of 
simplicity, strength and fit better than its competitors. 50 
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